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The Livingtone 2 (L2) model-based diagnosis software is a reusable diagnostic tool for monitoring 
c o m p b  systems. In 2004, L.2 was integrated with the JPL Autonomous Sciencecraft Experiment (ASE) 
and deployed on-board Goddard's Earth Observing One PO-1) remote sensing satellite, to monitor and 
diagnose dre EO-1 space science instrwnents and imaging sequence. This paper reports on lessons leamed 
from this flight experiment. 
The pals for this expdnent, including validation of minimum success crit&ia and of a series of 
diagnostic scenario$, have dl been successfully met. Long-term operations in space are on-going, as a test 
with L2 performance remaining flawless. L2 has demonstrated the ability to 
g nominal operations, detect simulated abnormalities in operations and 
fault. Specific advances demonstrated include diagnosis of ambiguity 
candidatx~ hypothesis revision given new sensor evidence about the state of 
cipbdity to check for faults in a dynamic system without having to wait until the 
anced health management technology are to increase missi 
fault protedtion, and robust autonornus oper?tions w1 
. The work-load for operators will be 
ather than raw data. The long-term vision is that of 
m e r  or executive, allowing autonomy software to re-plan in 
For a qaem that is expected to evolve substantialIy over its lifetime, as for the International Space 
Statim &e &l-based approach has definite advantages over rule-based expert systems and limit- 
checkiqj fault Protecgion systems. as these do not scale well. The model-based approach facilitates reuse of 
the L2 -tic software; only the model of the system to be diagnosed and telemetry monitoring 
software has to be rebuilt for a new system or expanded for a growing system. The hierarchical L2 model 
supports modularity and expandability, and as such is suitable solution for integrated system health 
management as envisioned for systems-of-systems. 
b o w n  component failures. 
1 Introduction 
Livingstone is a model-based diagnosis tool developed at NASA's Ames Research Center. It uses a 
model of a system, such as a spacecraft, along with the commands to and observations from the system, to 
determine the system's current state [7]. The original Livingstone was written in LISP, and implemented 
several research algorithms in model-based diagnosis. It was used on several applications projects, most 
prominently as the Mode IdenWiGation and Recovery cozqonent of the Remcte Agent Experiment (ItLe'y) 
that flew on Deep Space 1 in 1999 [5]. 
Livingstone 2 (L2) was developed tiom the algorithms in the original Livingstone, but written in C++ 
and with the new capability of diagnosing and tracking multiple faults over a time history [4]. L2 also has 
been used on several applications projects, including monitoring and diagnosis of the liquid propulsion feed 
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system for the X-34 reusable launch vehicle [8]; and of the electro-mechanical actuators on the X-37 
vehicle [9]. These X-vehicle programs were cancelled before reaching flight; however, the X-34 L2 
experiment was completed using high-fidelity simulation data. 
The current work, the Livingstone on Earth Observing One @O-1) experiment, is the fist  flight 
experiment of Livingstone since the Remote Agent. The experiment leverages the X-34 and X-37 work, 
and also NASA JPL’s Autonomous Sciencecraft Experiment (ASE) [6],  to accomplish deployment within 
tight schedule and resources. ASE consists of JPL’s continuous Activity Scheduling, Planning, Execution 
and Replanning (CASPER) planner; the science event detection software and the Spacecraft Command 
Language (SCL) from Interface and Control Systems (ICs). The experiment architecture and details of 
technical issues encountered during integration and adopted solutions are described in [l]. This report 
documents the final results of the experiment, and explores the potential for the Livingstone technology to 
improve current fault protection methods in use at GSFC. Gaps and shortcomings in Livingstone are also 
identified, to feed back into research and development of next-generation diagnostic technologies. 
2 Find Results of Experiment 
The LEO-1 experiment met and surpassed the predefined minimum success criteria (MSC). The 
MSC were defined as the set of diagnostic capabilities which establish progress over previous work. These 
capabilities were demonstrated by successful completion of 4 key scenarios on the spacecraft. Flight testing 
continued on to successfully validate 16 of the 17 defined scenarios. In addition, the LEO-1 experiment 
completed a long-duration test $overing many days of spacecraft operation. Thus, the LEO-I experiment 
met the MSC, and furthermore demonstrated the maturity of the diagnostic technology. Table 1 
summarizes the experiment’s results. 
Table 1: L2 on EO-1’s demonstrated functionality compared with previous Livingstone experiments 
Functionality 
2.1 Minimum Success Criteria MSC) 
The MSC, set out in [l], are a set of requirements for the experiment to establish progress over 
previous work. Briefly, the MSC are: 
SDacecraft Hardware in the LOOD 
The L2 experiment shall be deployed on-board EO-1, and shall demonstrate monitoring of 
nominal operations and diagnosis of anomalies in the spacecraft subsystems. 
Multiule Hwotheses 
Multiple alternative fault candidates shall be presented in the failure diagnosis, with an indication 
of relative likelihood. 
Multiule Hwotheses with Backtracking 
In light of new evidence, the list of diagnostic fault candidates shall be revised. This may entail a 
revision of the most likely fault candidate [4]. 
Diagnosis During Transients 
Diagnosis of a failure of one component shall not be delayed by concurrent commanding of other 
independent components on the spacecraft. Livingstone in general must wait for a system to 
achieve a steady-state after a command was issued in order to perform diagnosis; in L l  the entire 
system must be quiescent to do a diagnosis. This decreases the precision with which the state of 
commands are being issued co&ually, there will never 
In fm tk  work with L2 on PlTEX, the ability was developed to diagnose one subsystem 
subsystem is tr;9nsitioning. Drawbacks of this Real- Time Interface 
the diagnostic model. The idea of the model-based approach 
essful completion of the scenarios defined in the next section. 
. %XlMl’iQS We3ce 
ere executed, and their results. Two of the 
scenarios. Sixteen of the seventeen scenarios 
change. A sixnilar situation, ekbomted 
theless it was decided to proeked with 
“dd” telemetry could be 
ulrs in a missed diagnosis or false negative for.FSO1, during 
CF E: 
Candidate@) aidComponent--- 16 
3 
Final Diagnosis 
Fault(s) 
Fault Injected ID system 
FS02 I ALI I Data-GateFailedEnabled 
FS03 ALI Mechanism Power Failed Disabled 
FS04 1 ALI 1 Mechanism Power Failed Enabled 
FS06 
FS07 
FS08 
FS05 I ALI 1 Mechanism Power Sensor Failed 
ALI Aperture Cover Failed Closed 
ALI Aperture Cover Failed Open 
ALI Aperture Cover Failed Intermediate 
FS09 
FSlO 
ALI LED09Failed 
ALI LED08Failed 
FS20 I HSI 1 Aperture Cover Failed Open 
FS21 1 HSI 1 Aperture Cover Failed Closed 1 1 Electronicsbor , 
Aperture Cover Sensor Failed 
FS35 I WARP 1 FailedToRecord 
2.3 Coverage of New Activities for Extended Flight Operations 
The first upload of L2 was as part of the ASE R2 build. The extended runs of L2 were performed with 
the uplink of the ASE R3 build. CASPER now controlled several new activities of the spacecraft, and 
monitoring and diagnosis was expanded to support these new R3 activities. 
Support for the new activities did not require full modeling. Although it was very much desired to POW 
the model during this phase, project resources were inadequate for the task. There was a high risk of over- 
expanding the model beyond our ability to properly develop and test. To avoid blemishing the good record 
established thus far, a conservative approach was adopted and a set of minimal model changes with SCL 
support was implemented. 
expanding coverage to these 7 new activities, the main issue encountemd was observability. AS 7.2 
was running as part of ASE on a secondary processor, any commands coming from the C&DH flight 
software or from the ground (Absolute Time Sequence or ATS load) were not visible to L2. L2 only had 
access to the commands issued by ASE when the planner was in control of the spacecraft. Also, EO-1 has 
developed sequences of commands, called Relative Time Sequences (RTSs) for common command 
combinations. One RTS can then be invoked to accomplish a sequence of operations on board the satellite. 
However, the commands within the RTS are not visible to L2, and expansion of a single RTS command to 
its constituent co 
an image of the sun, whose spectral 
the new YCVRTOCAL command to L2, and 
d to perform an outgassing action to remove 
cover is left in a partially open state while the 
the new modes were added to the L2 model. SCL broke 
and forwarded them to L2. No new observations were 
on of the L2 model, but additional support from SCL 
a solar calibration. In this activity, the aperture cover 
ALT/HSI Lunar Calibration activity includes 
n of the lampal described above, no further 
the autonomous science operations of the ASE 
RTS 202 and 52 are wed at X-Band acquisition and loss of signal. The L2 model already included 
modes and transient modes corresponding to these activities. SCL broke out the commands from 
these RTSs, forwading the WARF' Band hardware and software commands (BCMMODEPB, 
WRMSXOUT, WRMEXOTJT) and WARP X-band telemetry (PLAYBACK, XBPB) to L2. 
2.4 ResultsQf- Fliaht Tests 
As shown in Table 3, the longest run thus far is 55 days. Cumulative operations time in space is at 
least 143 days. Average spacecraft activity was about 15 Data Collection Events (DCEs) per day. During 
these 143 days, there were no failures on the spacecraft within L2's diagnosis scope defined for this 
experiment. This is fortunate for the spacecraft and its mission, but means that L2 did not have an 
opportunity to diagnose actual spacecraft faults. L2 did report two false positives due to timing issues, 
explained below. 
Table 3: L2 Extended Flight Test Results 
Extended Test Period of False Positives/ Negatives Outcome 
Identifier . Operation__ or Software Bugs 
.- - -  - ADD J L L  ffl 
ASE R3 #3 
ASE R3 #4 r- 
LL usrya. 
12/1/2004 to 
12l22l2004 
49 hours. 
Day-of-year . 
@OW 
2005-012 
23 days. 
DOY 
2005-106 to 
2005-129 
41 days. 
DOY . 
2005-140 
to 2005-181 
55 days. 
DOY 
2005-192 
I’LUJG 1 UJLUVCS. 
No other issues reported. 
No problems with L2. 
No problems with L2. 
No problems with L2. 
False Positives. 
No other issues reported. 
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ASE was scheduling DCE and X-band 
activities concurrently. 
Success. 
Success for L2. 
ASE system was halted by an anomaly, 
requiring a cold start of the WARP processor. 
The problem was caused by the removal of a 
file from the ramdisk during processing by 
CASPER. 
Success. 
ASE system was halted to perform a 
Formation Flying maintenance maneuver and 
Pulsed Plasma Thruster (PPT) operations. 
L2 diagnosed false positives at the end of the 
run as SCL failed to notify L2 of a command 
that was executed in a timely manner. SCL 
was delayed due to CPU starvation. 
For extended run ASE R2 #1, ASE was not turning L2 off when a supported DCE activity overlapped 
with an unsupported X-band activity. Specifically, a data collect commenced before loss of signal for an X- 
band contact. This was a known issue for R2, as L2 did not receive X-band commands in R2, but was 
receiving the warp telemetry changes which result from X-bands and data collects. Normally, X-bands are 
completely masked for L2. However, when a DCE overlaps with an X-band activity, the WARP telemetry 
resulting from the X-band is seen but the initiating commands are not, resulting in a false positive. 
In the ASE R3 #4 false positive, the problem turned out not to be L2. L2 behaved correctly with the 
information it received. From the log files, the effect of a command to enable power to the ALI mechanism 
was seen before the command itself. This is a timing issue with SCL, which notifies L2 of commands and 
telemetry responses. In this case, SCL sent the command and its resultant observation out of order: 
observation,test.ali.MSI(P_MTR_PWRBNABLE, 1 125 804977,967542278 
co~d,testali.mechanismPower.command,I~MECHPO~R,1125804978,276990646 
The cause was CPU starvation; an SCL task got starved due to the heavy processor load, and so did 
not inform L2 of the command to turn on the ALI mechanism power in time, before the motor power 
ENABLED effect was seen. After playing back the CPU load telemetry at the time of the false positive, 
CPU usage was at 100% during the time that SCL delayed notification of the command to L2. CPU 
starvation of ASE has been noted in the past several times; root cause has not yet been determined however 
the low CPU availability margin is a known issue. 
The detail of the mechanism at work is that L2 must be notified by the rule that monitors changes on 
test-ali-mechanismPower-command. Once the SCL i-mechpower-cmd script issues an embedded &e. 
pre-compiled) command, it will almost certainly be pre-empted by a higher priority task before setting the 
test-ali-mechanismPower-command database item to I-MECHPOWER. Telemetry processing is done at a 
higher priority than script execution, so although the outgoing command telemetry is unaffected, it is the 
notification to L2 that is getting delayed because the task executing i-mechpower-cmd is getting starved 
n mechanism: if this experha t  was continued, the 
time in space of 143 days, L1 on Deep Space One 
for 20 hours before it was nated that plan execution 
between two threads in 
loss of a uitical monitor value, 
. This led Ll’s estimation of 
te. The discrepancy proved to be benign and execution of the 
the diagnostic engine and 
appears to be free of race 
leaks. With the exception of the noted timing error, the S C L  software 
w of GSFC Fault Protection Technology 
sions operated by Goddarrl typically use a combination of Telemetry Statistical Monitors (TSMs) 
and Fault Detection and cadnricrion (pr>C) for fault protection. These operate at the spacecraft or system 
wer Subsystem Electronics 
s is later discussed. 
e Telemetry Statistical Monitor (TSM) system is resident within the Mongoose V Command and 
Data b d l i n g  (C&DH) Processor. It provides fault protection across all subsystems, including PSE. Two 
levels of automatic protection are handled by TSMs. If these first two levels of protection do not prevent 
the p r o p s  of the fault, a third level of automatic protection is provided by the FDC actions at the PSE 
subsystem Remote Senrice Node 0. Then are four TSMs and RTS responses in the automatic 
protection system for power. The TSM actions will take place when out of limit conditions are experienced 
for B- Differential Voltage, BattEry Low Voltage, Battery High Temperature, and Battery Low State 
of Charge. For cxanrflbe, TSM #ti50 checks for low Battery State of Charge (BSOC): 
If BSOC < 85% issOe event message 
If BSOC > 30% and BSOC e 70% call Safe Power (RTS #19) 
WhGn the parameta being monitored by the TSM exceeds the first (most sensitive) level of limit 
violation, the TSM will issue a limit violation event message after three consecutive violations. If the 
parameter telemetry value continues to degrade and the out of limit reading exceeds the second limit level 
(more severe violation), the TSM will initiate a series of preprogrammed commands to attempt to protect 
the spacerraft and comet the h i t  violation. This series of pre-programmed commands is a Relative Timed 
Sequence (RTS). RTSs are designated individual sequence numbers to iden* them; for TSM M50, RTS 
#19 initiates the loadshed and safehold sequence. 
3.2 Automated Subsvstem ResDonse: Fault Detection and Correction EOC) 
FDCs provide health management local to each subsystem. The PSE RSN processor colitii;uously 
monitors the power system spacecraft telemetry and automatically responds to certain telemetry limit 
violations in a similar but not identical fashion as the automated TSM response. The limits for the FDC are 
set to more forgiving levels than the stricter TSM limits, the idea being that the FDC will kick in should the 
TSM fail to act. The logic flow chart for the 3 PSE FDCs is shown in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: EO-1 FDCs for the Power Subsystem Electrollics 
TSMs, with their stricter redlines, normally perform all loadshedding and safehold, since the PSE 
FDCs cannot load shed other subsystems. The PSE FDCs serve as a backup should the TSMs fail to trip. 
Each trigger on the left is linked to the corrective action(s) on the right. For example, the first FDC 
corresponds to the low BSOC TSM ##050. This FDC will trigger two actions if battery voltage drops below 
25.2V: first setting BSOC to 5096 to force triggering of TSM #050 if it did not already trip for some reason. 
Second, loadshedding local to PSE is implemented by lowering the battery charge rate by setting the 
Voltage/Temperature curve to 3 (normally the charge rate is 4.5). In addition, several parameters are set to 
their normal values: battery maximum current to 10A to prevent overcharging; trickle current set to 
nominal 0.5% and the battery C/D (chargddischarge) factor is set to 1.05, reflecting the fact that the 
battery is not perfectly efficient. 
3.3 Evaluation of the TSM / FDC ADDroach 
Ground Operations for EO-1 are conducted at the GSFC Mission Operation Center (MOC). The 
command and control software in the MOC is the Advanced Spacecraft Integration and System Test 
(ASIST). The matrix of all TSMs flying on EO-1 is shown in the ASIST workstation display in Figure 2. 
Advantages of the TSM aDDroach are: 
TSMs are simple to write and inspect, as they usually only operate on one telemetry point (also be seen 
as a limitation). 
TSMs can be individually enabled and disabled. If a TSM often generates false positives, it can be 
disabled until a patch to the spacecraft software can be uploaded. This can also be used to allow the 
operators of the spacecraft to perform actions that were not envisioned at design time, but are later 
determined to be necessary and safe. For example, one TSM is tripped when the spacecraft instrument 
covers are open and the spacecraft begins to point toward the sun, which will damage the instnunents. 
However, this maneuver is allowable when the spacecraft is in the Earth’s shadow. When the maneuver is 
necessary, this TSM is disabled, then re-enabled after the maneuver is complete. 
I 
WGakoesSts of th e TSM a m  a& 
TSMs do not identify root cause. A common failure e.g. 
power, would cause the display to light up like a Christmas 
tree, as in the niultiple red fault indicators in this display. 
TSMs do not detect sensor failures. 
TSMS do not show ambiguity i.e. alternate failures which 
&%it the same symptoms, such as a component or its 
associated sensor failing. 
TSMs do not indicate the probability of the diagnosis, 
where there is ambiguity as to the acW fault. 
* TSMs do not indicate the time the failure occurred. 
4 TSMs do not monitor across multiple telemetry points. 
TSM is defined for a single telemetry point, With 
es between TSMs manually inserted. 
g of the TSMs is performed to ensure 
;. The number of TSMs imjdemented for EO-1 was limited 
due to development effort and cost. Scalability is a challenge 
ibr rule-based system, due to the lack of structure in the set 
of fault proteetion rules. 
Non-intuitive user intelface - unless the operator b w s  
the TSM matrix very well, it does not provide insight at a 
glance. The operator must examine each effected TSM to 
&tennine the problem. 
designed so that spacecraft protection was st i l l  
M protection at C W H  was malfunctioning. 
to TSMs, FDCs suffer from many of the same limitations as 
- it is quite possible that an FDC limit violation may occur after a 
. In this case TSM and FDC responses will be operating in parallel. 
be designed so that there are no conflicts between the two systems. 
comctiye actions are limited to the scope of the subsystem, and any 
impact on 0th subsystems is handled by TSMs. If system-level response is required, a TSM must be 
tripped to inhiate wider recovery of the spacecraft. In this way the FDC which sets BSOC = 50% will 
trip TSM #50 to do load shedc2ing and safehold. This relationship is implicit and if improperly managed 
could result in unexpected behavior with potentially severe consequences. 
4 Value Added by the L2 Model-Based Diagnosis Approach 
The TSM/FDC fault protection technology has several weaknesses which have been identified in the 
previous section. This section discusses L2 solutions to these issues, both in the context of the EO-1 
experiment and of previous work 131. 
4.1 Root Cause Analvsis: 
Whereas TSMs and FDCs do not perform root cause analysis, L2 has the capability to determine the 
root cause of the fault, exonerating dependent components which exhibit related symptoms but have not 
themselves failed. TSMs/FDCs on the other hand are rule-based. It is possible to construct a higher-level 
rule that reasons over a set of rules, to figure out common cause. However the individual TSMs would still 
fire and present as multiple faults, since exoneration of a fault requires additional reasoning. This is all 
handled naturally by L2, with no special support required by the model. The analysis is encoded in the 
domain-independent L2 algorithm and involves reasoning about the relative likelihood of multiple 
simultaneous faults and their interdependencies. 
Root cause analysis is demonstrated in the L2 test scenarios for EO-1, for example in one of the 
imaging component main aperture cover models. The ALI aperture cover opens and closes to allow the 
component to take an image. The aperture cover and its supply power are both modeled. If there is a failure 
in the supply power component, then the aperture cover will not move when commanded, although it is 
working nominally. This corresponds to experiment fault scenario #5. As it is expected that the cover will 
not move when there is no power, L2 does not implicate the aperture cover in this scenario and instead 
diagnoses the failed supply power component. 
In the event that there is no root cause, L2 is also able to diagnose multiple faults, occunkg 
simultaneously or separately. The diagnostic scenarios #8 and #9 show this feature of L2. They each 
contain two candidates, one of which contains multiple faults. 
4.2 Diaanosis under Uncertaintv: 
In a complex system with multiple points of failure, there is always uncertainty - due to noise in the 
sensor data, and due to restricted observability. Spacecraft tend to be under-sensed, from a health 
management perspective, to keep weight down at launch. L2 is resilient to gaps in sensor coverage, able to 
track the state of the spacecraft and diagnose faults even if missing some sensor information. This is due to 
the fact that L2 uses a conflict-driven search, triggered by evidence of conflict with predicted behavior. The 
Real-Time Interface @TI) and Transient ModeIing methodology developed for EO-1 [l] also support 
continued mode estimation during transients, prior to receiving sensor responses to commands or whilst 
dynamical transients in the physical system are settling down. 
Ambiguity is represented by L2 in an ambiguity group of multiple diagnostic candidates, with a 
likelihood assigned to each candidate. Most of the diagnostic scenarios of the experiment involve multiple 
candidates. Usually this expresses the possibility that a component could have failed, or a sensor 
monitoring the component failed. Since all sensors are modeled with at least one failure mode (indeed all 
components are), detection of sensor failures is well-supported by L2. 
L2 also maintains a history of alternate trajectories, which allows fault hypotheses to be revised 
given new information. Two of the fault scenarios, #11 and #12, illustrate this. The initial diagnosis of each 
contained two candidates. As the scenario progressed, one of the candidates was found to be inconsistent 
with later observations and eliminated from the diagnosis, improving fault isolation. 
For decision support, to enact recovery or to schedule maintenance for rapid turnaround, L2 reports 
the likelihood of each diagnostic candidate in an ambiguity group. This is a relative ranking based on a 
priori component failure probabilities. Where a single candidate contains multiple failures, the rankings are 
summed to give the rank for the candidate. In addition, the time of the failure is reported. 
4.3 Model-Based Ooerations: 
Another advantage of the L2 model-based diagnosis approach is that it lends itself to model-based 
operations. Taken to the limit, model-based operations could encompass ground and flight segments as well 
as the communication links between them. The flight segment may be expanded to satellite consteIlations 
such as the EO-1 and Landsat-7 formation. For this experiment, only flight operations of the EO-1 
spacecraft were in the scope of the model. 
The strength of model-based operations is that the application, procedures or software which 
implement the required functionality are generic and not domain-specific. There is a separate model or set 
of models which describes the instance to which the software applies and must reason about. This model is 
specific to the domain, such as a spacecraft, launch vehicle. or ground station. Model-based approaches 
have been developed both for planning and diagnosis, providing control and feedback for operations. 
For EO-1, a single model was used for the spacecraft. with the subsystems contained as modules 
therein. Unlike TSMs which have no mss-checking to ensure global consistency, the constraints within the 
L2 model enforce consistency checks both within the subsystem and across subsystems at the system level. 
Unlike TSMS which gaueraty are defined for a single telemetry point, L2 uses a first-principles diagnostic 
model of the system, which has broader scope and d e l s  the reality of multiple telemetry points associated 
w i t h c o m p o ~ k t h e m o d e l .  
mt;lge for L2; a single, consistent L2 model conveniently encapsulates the error 
k v d  TSMs. Scalability has not been proven for L2 by modeling a very large 
des, god Oomparing the two approaches. However, scalability is known to 
sys&m. For example, on EO-1 only a restricted subset of TSMs was 
required set demanded greater engineering effort than could be afforded. 
with W a n a t i d  Space Station (ISS), modeling the C m H  subsystem using 
scale coonplex system, this domain wil l  serve as a stress test of U s  
tive adom may be taken by both TSMs and FM3s. Interactions between 
m a t i d y  tracked or managed, making recovery procedures difficult to venfy. 
a &gb model does not have the duplication of TSM and FDCs. This 
C con%ict, a kind of race condition in which both the system and 
resolve a problem, However, the single model approach does not have 
n of ASm2 fault protection or communication with ASE52. It is 
into constituent subsystems and deploy each of these separately, with the 
to the systemlevel d e l .  A distributed application of L2 has yet to be 
neqUire a disttibuted fault protection architecture. For instance, in a hard real- 
detection, isolation and recovery should be 
fault is required the system-level 
supports an intuitive user-inteifh. 
shown in Figure 3 below. In this 
has failed. This type of situation 
the current deployment on EO-1, 
und Processing Unit (GPU), whrch provides this graphical display, 
L2 tekmtry page used instead on EO-1 is presented in [l]. 
Figure 3: L2 Diagnostic Display of X-34 Feed System 
In addition to flagging failed components, L2 monitors nominal mode transitions of components of 
the system, and these mode changes can also be shown on the schematic display. Mode transitions are 
included in the EO-1 telemetry downlink, and the L2 telemetry page displays the mode of the last 
component which transitioned. This may mean that should Several transitions occur quickly, only the last 
transition is Visible on the stack. A history stack of mode transitions was not downlinked to conserve 
telemetry bandwidth. 
L2 also has an explanation capability which can be queried for causal chains of inference, just&'ing 
the diagnosis. This is not supported by the current EO-1 deployment, as explanations are provided by the 
L2 debugging classes which are not part of the flight code. In addition, explanation telemetry requires a 
reasonable amount of bandwidth as well as definition of a new telemetry packet, of which only a limited 
number are available, as well as requiring support for uplinking queries from ground operators. 
5 Weaknesses of the L2 Model-Based Diagnosis Approach 
Previously, general strengths and weaknesses of L2 were identified in [3]. The deployment on EO-1 
exposed several areas of improvement for L2. Lessons learned and known weaknesses are categorized in 
the areas of diagnosis, fault coverage, recovery and operations support. 
5.1 Diagnosis: 
a) L2 supports discrete models only, with no support for continuous modeling. L2 can diagnose 
continuous systems, such as a tank being overfilled, by modeling a discrete abstraction of the system 
and externalizing the continuous processing in the monitor software. However this becomes 
cumbersome if a si@cant amount of continuous behavior must be captured to diagnose the 
system, with the binning strategy and interface between model and monitors requiring careful 
design. 
This limitation affected the scope of the E01 model. The components chosen for inclusion in the 
model consisted almost entirely of those with discrete behavior. Although the spacecraft is largely a 
discrete system with discrete telemetry, attitude control, power and the HSI cryocooler exhibit 
continuous behavior, and as such were deemed out of scope. 
b) L2 does not support autonomous mode transitions, which are spontaneous mode changes not 
initiated by controller commands. For example, a relief valve will open when its crack pressure is 
exceeded, with no controller command. The design decision not to support autonomous mode 
transitions had benefits of simplicity and speed. However, to detect certain changes, a more general 
conditional trigger is required that is based on both commands and observations and initiates the 
transition whenever the component is in that mode and the conditional expression evaluates to true. 
Autonomous mode transitions were not encountered in the scope of the EO-1 model. 
c) L2 does not support modeling of controllers, specifically prediction of the commands that they 
issue. Several EO-1 instruments, such as the ALI, have on-board controllers which perform 
requested services such as lamp calibration. The problem is that their internal commands do not go 
out on the spacecraft bus, and lack of visibility to internal commanding impairs L2's ability to 
predict behavior of the component. To address this,  either L2 must have the ability to predict the 
hidden controller commands (e.g. from a command which initiates the sequence) or the system 
needs to be designed to give diagnosis tools the observability they require. However, it is common 
for diagnosis to be developed after the spacecraft's design, rather than the best practice of designing- 
in diagnosis as an early and integral part of the development process. For advanced diagnosis 
research tools such as L2, this is even more so the case, being integrated into the spacecraft after 
deployment. A workaround for these issues for L2 on EO-1 was provided by SCL generation of the 
internal command sequences. 
d) There is no support for timed transitions in the L2 model, &I allow for real-time &lays in issuing 
a command and acquiring the response sensor data. Currently a combination of Real-Time Interface 
@TI) software and the transient modeling methodology supports this. This weakness increased the 
amount of development required to deploy L2 on EO-1. The RTI software from PITEX [8] was 
revised for EO-1 to support timeouts for real-time delays, and the transient modeling methodology 
requires many additional transient modes and transitions in the model. 
s 
5.2 
5.3 
5.4 
Fault covenee: 
a) L2 is able to ulenhiy abrupt faults, where the evidence of the fault is either ly apparent 
or is reveaied by a command e.g. 0-g of the stuck valve. Most of the faults on EO-1 are of this 
nature. L2 has no support for prognosis of incipient faults, although this could be provided by 
extend monitorS. Them is aIso no support for identifyins cascading faults, where the initial fault is 
causally linked to subsequent faults e.g. a regulator fails and the pressure surge blows a downstream 
relief valve / O-ring; or domestic object h g e  to neatby objects should a turbine blade be thrown. 
Fault modts invbhriag prognosk and cascading faults were not identified on EO- 1. 
b) To date, no damnstration of hard real-time fault diagnosis (on the order of milliseconds) has 
been made by an integrated L2 applircation. This was also not achievable on EO-1 due to saturation 
of the 8 MIPS CPU. On EO-1, sensor sampling rates range from 1 to 4 seconds, with Hyperion 
telemetery at 1 second and WARPlAIJ telemetry at 4 second intervals. However, telemetry 
processing by the SCL software bridge often lags, causing L2 and ASE to utilize much longer real- 
delays to await incoming telemetry. These delays range from 8 to 40 seconds for L2. Telemetry 
p e s s i n g  lags are due to the fact that the WARP CPU is severely constrained, flying both the 
WARP flight software and the ASE?/L2 experiments. Soft real-time performance can be claimed for 
the experiment, as we cau guarantee meting these longer delays. 
for recognizing spontaneous recoveq from an intermittent fault, as this 
implies an autonomous tiansition h m  an anomalous to a nominal mode e.g a wire shorting on 
contact under vibration. 
b) L2 models have not yet been developed that can recognize that functiodty has been preserved 
to a backup on failure of a component, even though the component remains 
be accomplished through a functional model. This was not explored on EO-1 as 
sentially single string. 
L.2 mDdels do not indicate severity or time to criticality of a fault Impact, time to criticality and 
influence the recovery action to be selected and enacted. It may be possible to devise 
captures this, but L2 has no built-in representation or reasoning about the severity of 
L2 has limited ability to recognize transition back to nominal operations, in the case of fault 
overy through human or controller intervention. Supported recoveries must be commanded and 
recovery transitions explicitly modeled. In addition, this recovery recommendation is generated by a 
separate instanct'of 32. Since this adds significant complexity to the architecture and integration, 
and little redundmcy exists on the EO-1 spacecraft to demonstrate recovery, this functionality was 
wn on EO-1. 
tion that the initial configuration of the model, say So = {so, sl, . . .s,} where s, is 
the state of componentlsubsystem n, must match the initial configuration of the -get system at 
startup. There is no ability to discover the initial state of the system from sensor observations. In 
fairness, to determine the initial state from sensor observations would require that the system be 
fully instrumented, which for an under-sensed system is an indeterminate problem Also, starting 
the benefit that mode identification is resilient to unknown sensor values, 
f L2. The weakness must be traded-off against the strength it enables. 
To accommodate, the initial state of the L2 model was chosen to be EO-1's "idle" configuration. 
When NIlDing the L2 experiment scenarios, checks in the L2 startup procedure used by the EO1 
flight opedons team dm L2 to slart successfdly only if the satellite is m tlre idle mode. If L2 
were to be started when the satellite is in a different mode, false positives would result as the 
satellite would 
b) On EO-1, L2 only acted as a monitoring and diagnosis agent. The current modes of the system 
are tracked and whether faults have occurred or not, but L2 gives no indication of the criticality of 
faults nor recodn&tio& to recover from them L2 does not clear fault alerts, since the recovery 
instance of L2 is not flying on EO-1. Once a component has failed, L2 will report that a component 
fault occurred at time t until L2 is shut down, even if the fault was recovered from or a backup 
system was activated. The only circumstance that the diagnosis is cleared is in the event of the 
making state transitiom not possible from the initial mode. 
search space becoming exhausted. This may occur in a situation of massive failure, in which case 
there is no diagnosis which can explain the multiple s&ultaneous faults within the parameters of the 
search algorithm (including maximum likelihood). 
6 Conclusion 
This experiment has successfully deployed Livingstone 2 on-board EO-1. By meeting the minimum 
success requirements, L2 has demonstrated advances over previous work, most sigmficantly: 
9 Capability to track multiple diagnostic hypotheses and revise hypotheses given new evidence, wortant 
in any complex system; 
9 Capability to monitor the spacecraft state and diagnose faults during transients, both under partial 
observability (before telemetry responses are seen) and whilst the physical dynamics of the system are 
settling out. 
After meeting these criteria, work continued on to verify a series of scenarios and give complete 
coverage of the imaging model. The number of scenarios tested was increased, from 2 for RAX to 17 for 
the L2 on EO-1 experiment. L2 was shown to be capable of long-term space operations, with the longest 
extended run thus far of 55 days with no false positives. Cumulative operations time in space is at least 143 
days. This is a s i w c a n t  increase over Livingstone’s previous longest flight time of 20 hours, achieved by 
Remote Agent on Deep Space One. 
Finally, L2 has demonstrated that it has potential to add-value to flight operations in general, and in 
particular that it has the ability to improve on several weaknesses identified in the TSh4/F’DC fault 
protection approach. Major strengths are: 
0 Deeper diagnosability, including root cause analysis and reasoning about ambiguity. 
0 Model-based operations can be grown from model-based diagnosis. 
next-generation Hybrid Diagnostic Engine (HyDE), which is currently under development at Ames. 
Weaknesses in the L2 approach have also been identified, and these form new requirements for the 
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